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Roy Dings

• It has been argued that affordances are not \(\it meaningful\) and are thus not useful to be applied in contexts where specifically meaningfulness of experience is at stake (e.g. clinical contexts or discussions of autonomous agency). This paper aims to reconceptualize affordances such as to make them relevant and applicable in such contexts. It starts by investigating the "ambiguity" of (possibilities for) action. In both philosophy of action and affordance research, this ambiguity is typically resolved by adhering to the agents intentions and concerns. I discuss some recent accounts of affordances that highlight these concerns but argue that they tend to adopt an 'atomistic' approach where there is no acknowledgement of how these concerns are embedded in the agents wider concerns, values, projects and commitments. An holistic approach that \(\it does\) acknowledge this can be found in psychological research on agents having a \(\textit {sense of what they're doing}\). I will discuss this research in the second part of the paper and argue that agents can analogously have a \(\textit {sense of what is afforded}\). This is deemed the entry point for understanding the meaningfulness of affordances. In the final part of the paper I apply this analysis to recent attempts which seek to make sense of authentic and autonomous agency in terms of affordances.