Self‑set salaries and creativity

  • Organizations frequently try to incentivize employees to develop highly creative solutions. In this study, we examine self-set salaries as a specific type of incentive design. We investigate whether self-set salaries affect employees’ motivation and overall (creative) performance. Moreover, because self-set salaries potentially risk opportunistic employee behavior, we consider the effect of the observability of peer performance on employees’ level of self-set salaries. Using a laboratory experiment, we hold the average employee compensation constant and demonstrate that, in comparison with fixed-pay contracts, self-set salaries increase the quantitative performance in creative tasks without affecting the average creativity. However, we do not find significant differences between the amount of individuals’ self-set salaries with observability of peer performance and the amount for individuals without the chance to observe peer performance. Our findings are important for firms that rely on the development of creative ideas but are unsure about the effects of the introduction of self-set salaries.

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Metadaten
Author:Christian BrückORCiDGND, Thorsten KnauerORCiDGND, Harald MeierGND, Anja SchweringORCiDGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:hbz:294-83270
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-020-00985-z
Parent Title (English):Journal of Business Economics
Publisher:Springer Nature
Place of publication:Berlin
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2021/09/09
Date of first Publication:2020/05/06
Publishing Institution:Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsbibliothek
Tag:Autonomy; Creativity; Employee participation; Incentives; Self-set salaries
Volume:91
First Page:91
Last Page:121
Note:
Dieser Beitrag ist auf Grund des DEAL-Springer-Vertrages frei zugänglich.
Dewey Decimal Classification:Sozialwissenschaften / Wirtschaft
open_access (DINI-Set):open_access
faculties:Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft
Licence (English):License LogoCreative Commons - CC BY 4.0 - Attribution 4.0 International