BAM BAM!! On reliability of EMFI for in-situ automotive ECU attacks
- Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EMFI) is a well-known technique for performing fault injection attacks. While such attacks may be easy demonstrated in a laboratory condition, information about the applicability of them to real-life environments is critical for designer of ECUs to understand the effort that should be spent on protecting against them. This work targets a recent (2019) automotive ECU, and analyzes the target microcontroller used in laboratory conditions, and then transitions the attack to a real-world "in-situ" attack similar to a garage bench. The specific work appears relevant to several devices in the MPC55xx and MPC56xx series, which are automotive-focused PowerPC devices.
Author: | Colin O'FlynnGND |
---|---|
URN: | urn:nbn:de:hbz:294-75424 |
DOI: | https://doi.org/10.13154/294-7542 |
Parent Title (English): | 18\(^{th}\) escar Europe : The World's Leading Automotive Cyber Security Conference (Konferenzveröffentlichung) |
Document Type: | Part of a Book |
Language: | English |
Date of Publication (online): | 2020/09/29 |
Date of first Publication: | 2020/09/29 |
Publishing Institution: | Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsbibliothek |
Tag: | EMFI; fault injection; physical security; secure boot |
First Page: | 1 |
Last Page: | 15 |
Dewey Decimal Classification: | Allgemeines, Informatik, Informationswissenschaft / Informatik |
open_access (DINI-Set): | open_access |
Konferenz-/Sammelbände: | 18th escar Europe : The World's Leading Automotive Cyber Security Conference |
Licence (German): | Keine Creative Commons Lizenz - es gelten die Rechteeinräumung und das deutsche Urheberrecht |