Political institutions and financial cooperative development

  • This paper analyses the influence of political institutions on the development of financial cooperatives. It proposes a political economy theory where autocratic regimes deliberately oppose the development of a well-functioning financial cooperative sector to maintain their political influence, and prevent the formation of strong pressure groups that can threaten the current political status quo and reduce the governing elites’ economic benefits from underdeveloped and exclusive financial sector. Using panel data from 65 developing countries from 1995–2014, the results show that democracy, political rights and civil liberties promote financial cooperative development. These results are robust in controlling for endogeneity as well as other economic and institutional factors.

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Metadaten
Author:Amr KhafagyGND
URN:urn:nbn:de:hbz:294-65988
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1017/S174413741600031X
Parent Title (English):Journal of institutional economics
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
Place of publication:Cambridge
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Date of Publication (online):2019/09/24
Date of first Publication:2016/11/02
Publishing Institution:Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsbibliothek
Volume:13
Issue:2
First Page:467
Last Page:498
Note:
© Copyright Cambridge University Press. Permission for reuse must be granted by Cambridge University Press in the first instance.
Institutes/Facilities:Institut für Entwicklungsforschung und Entwicklungspolitik (IEE)
open_access (DINI-Set):open_access
Licence (German):License LogoNationale Lizenz